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Abstract 
 
 
The Cambridge Social Ontology (CSO) programme’s inability to generate a 
meaningful dialogue with mainstream economics is difficult to understand by mere 
reference to judgmental rationality and without reference to CSO’s ideological 
configuration. Our paper uses an économie des conventions framework to draw 
systematic comparisons between CSO’s ideological configuration and the ideological 
configurations of mainstream economic theories and practice. The resulting analysis 
helps us to understand not only why CSO generated little response from the 
mainstream, but also how CSO might renew its critique in ways that might be more 
likely to produce a response.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the late 1980s, defenders of what has come to be called Cambridge Social 
Ontology (CSO) have seen it as a foil for mainstream economic modelling. Tony 
Lawson (1997) constructed and elaborated a methodological critique which attempts to 
undercut the more traditional theoretical objections offered by most heterodox 
economists. Yet after nearly thirty years of prolific intellectual activity, CSO has 
received few direct responses from mainstream modellers. Instead, both critical and 
supportive voices have come almost entirely from outside the mainstream and from 
across the other social sciences.  
 
Some methodologists (Colander et al 2004; Davis 2006) have tried to explain the lack 
of response by reference to changing trends within economics. They argue that 
heterodox critics of mainstream economics in general, and Lawson in particular, 
provide outdated critiques and do not engage adequately with current trends in 
economics. More specifically, these commentators claim that what could previously 
have been described as a cohesive mainstream with a relatively limited set of 
assumptions and methods has been supplanted by a more heterogeneous group of 
cutting edge research programmes that recognise both the dynamics and complexity of 
economic systems and as such are sometimes (perhaps even often) indistinguishable 
from what Lawson and CSO refer to as the heterodoxy. This argument appears to at 
least partially lay responsibility for the inability to engage with mainstream economics 
at the door of proponents of CSO: they have failed to recognise the diversity and 
dynamism of current ‘mainstream’ approaches, which amongst other things renders 
their critique irrelevant since the new approaches have taken on ‘heterodox’ 
assumptions.  It is not within the remit of this article to specifically refute these 
arguments, which, in our opinion, were answered directly by Lawson himself in his 
response to Davis and elsewhere (Lawson 2009: 103-106, Lawson 2006: 491-495). 
However, it is worth noting that the research programmes that Davis and Colander cite 
as examples of cutting edge mainstream research all employ mathematical deductivist 
methods and present their analytical findings in the form of models (for a specific 
example, see Latsis & Repapis 2014). Our position, contra Davis and Colander, is that 
the limited impact of CSO arguments on the mainstream does not come from CSO’s 
failure to engage with mainstream ideas, but with the mainstream’s lack of interest in 
considering criticism levelled by proponents of CSO and respond in a coherent manner 
(though there are inevitably a small number of exceptions). Given the scope and 
ambition of the CSO critique, this relative silence is, prima facie, rather surprising. 
While claims that CSO has missed mainstream economics’ renewed assumptions are 
unconvincing, we are left with a puzzle: why is CSO’s critique perceived as irrelevant 
and devoid of value from mainstream economics’ perspective when it seems relevant 
and valuable from its own perspective? 
 
One way of explaining the failure of critical dialogue and debate is to invoke the 
existence of competing paradigms locked in their own language games and unable to 
address each other directly. But, in this case, a simplistic Kuhnian interpretation is not 
convincing for at least two reasons. First CSO is a philosophical and methodological 
critique, not a competing theoretical research paradigm. Second, CSO explicitly 
endorses ‘judgmental rationality’, which is the view that there are universal/isable ways 
of discriminating between theories, and it therefore rejects the Kuhnian notion of 
incommensurability.  
 
Some commentators (e.g. Lawson 2007) have already pointed out that the absence of 
critical engagement and dialogue may indicate psychological or social-psychological  
characteristics that are typically favoured within the  mainstream profession, but have 
the perverse side-effect of both narrowing the field and limiting discussions with 
outsiders. And recent sociological contributions (e.g. Fourcade et al. 2015) explain how 
the lack of engagement is facilitated by the current institutional environment. But these 
undoubtedly valuable psychological and sociological insights do not provide a 
theoretical explanation of why CSO’s critique has fallen on deaf ears. It is our 
contention that the économie des conventions (EC), with its explicit focus on situated 
judgement, the construction of legitimacy, critique and agreement can provide a 
compelling framework within which to understand CSO’s limited impact on the 
mainstream.  
 
Our argument in the remainder of this article has the following structure. First we take 
stock of CSO’s inability to engage in dialogue with, let alone affect the dominance of, 
mainstream modelling. Second, we explain the notion of judgmental rationality in the 
critical realist philosophical tradition and link it to the project of social ontology more 
generally and the Cambridge variant in particular. Third, we outline the core insights 
of the EC on the role of justification in the social sciences, focussing on the contribution 
of Thevenot and Boltanski in their book On Justification (2006) and on their important 
follow-up paper ‘The reality of moral expectations: a sociology of situated judgement’ 
(Boltanski & Thevenot 2000). Fourth, we use the EC framework to compare and 
contrast the different forms of judgement that are deemed to be legitimate within CSO 
and mainstream economics. The final part of our article discusses the broader 
implications of our findings for social ontology and for future discussions between CSO 
and EC and between CSO and mainstream economics 
 
1. The Dialogue of the Deaf  
 
Starting in the late 1980s, Tony Lawson’s contributions have emphasised the lack of fit 
between the methods of modern mainstream economics and the nature of social reality. 
The basis of his critique of the mainstream has been that the mathematical modelling 
methods employed by mainstream economists presuppose that the social world is a 
closed system made up of atomistic individuals. His contention is that, in contrast to 
the presuppositions of the mainstream, the social world is open and made up of 
complex, reflexive subjects and emergent structures. He draws on Roy Bhaskar’s 
philosophical writings (Bhaskar 1975/2008; 1979/2014), the history of economic 
thought (Kline 1964; Henry 1997; Gingras 2001) and on contemporary contributions 
to heterodox economics to show that an adequate economic theory can be constructed 
using different methods and relying on a different philosophical ontology1 – one that is 
consistent with his own conception of the nature of social reality. Lawson employs two 
types of arguments to bolster his case. The first is an immanent critique2 showing how 
mainstream economics fails by its own empirical standards of testing and prediction 
(see e.g. Lawson, 1997: 3-11). The repeated failure of economics is then used as a point 
of departure for an ontological discussion of the nature of social reality and economic 
systems of production and exchange (see esp. Lawson 2003). The second discusses the 
nature of social reality, and the possibility of its systematic study, by appealing directly 
to our experience of social life and the common sense knowledge that all appropriately 
socialised human beings need to carry out their lives (see e.g. Lawson, 1997 157-187). 
Together, these arguments provide a powerful case against the scientific status of 
mainstream modelling and the conception of social reality that it implicitly 
presupposes.  
 
After the publication of Economics and Reality, there was a significant critical response 
to the CSO project and to Tony Lawson’s writings in particular. Participants in the 
debate came from the philosophy of economics (e.g. Hausman 1998, Hausman 1999, 
Cottrell 1998, Parsons 1999) and from heterodox economics (e.g. Hodgson 1999, Dow 
1999). Much of this early debate was reviewed and discussed in an edited volume by 
Steve Fleetwood (Fleetwood 1999). No mainstream economist engaged in this stage of 
the debate despite the fact that many of Lawson’s ideas that crystallised in the book had 
initially been published in a series of journal articles in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
 
In subsequent years Lawson and other members of CSO continued to publish critical 
material about mathematical modelling in economics and extended their critique to 
specific sectors of the economy (eg Fleetwood 2006, Morgan 2009) and specific 
economic techniques (e.g. Lawson 1989, Pratten 2005). There was also a concerted 
effort to construct an alternative philosophical ontology in which heterodox economists 
could anchor their different approaches (Lawson 2003, 2006). Again, these efforts 
received considerable attention in heterodox and methodology circles, as well as 
growing interest from sociology (e.g. Elder-Vass 2010) management studies (e.g. Al-
Amoudi & Willmott 2011; Brown and Roberts 2014; Fleetwood 2005; Reed 1997) and 
several other social science disciplines. Yet, once again, there was virtually no response 
from mainstream economists with the notable exception of one short chapter by the 
                                                 
1 We define ‘philosophical ontology’ more precisely below. 
2 By immanent critique we mean a critique that takes the objectives of the target theory as given and 
proceeds by ‘exposing internal inconsistencies in beliefs implicit in practices, or demonstrating how 
beliefs held cannot accommodate practices actually achieved.’ (Lawson 1997: 211). 
Nobel prize winning econometrician Clive Granger (2004) in an edited collection 
(Lewis 2004).  
 
The latter is an interesting piece because it combines sociological and substantive 
arguments in its defence of the mainstream. In the first part of the paper Granger points 
out that a critique based on the failure of modern mainstream economics faces the 
empirical counter argument that the discipline is (or was at the time), by all sociological 
measures, in rude health: journals, conferences, departments and prizes abound; the 
discipline recruits many students at post graduate level; and economists are often paid 
to advise governments and private firms. Granger also provides a more substantive 
riposte to some parts of Lawson’s argument. Yet this riposte is notable for both its 
modesty and its narrowness. Granger doesn’t claim to speak for economists, but merely 
for econometricians; he doesn’t defend high theory, but merely the use of specific 
statistical techniques and tools within econometrics. Indeed he is sometimes critical of 
econometricians, but alludes (in the same way as Davis and Colander) to recent 
developments that purportedly resolve some of the empirical worries voiced by Lawson 
and other proponents of CSO. On meta-theory he says little of note, except to point out 
that econometricians assume the existence of a ‘data generating mechanism’ (which he 
equates with CSO’s conception of social reality), and that it is ‘convenient to start’ with 
the assumption that economics is a decision science (which he then couches in terms of 
methodological individualism and rational choice). Thus, his philosophical 
assumptions are asserted without argument nor appeal to previous arguments, 
apparently without an appreciation of their fundamental importance for any subsequent 
theorisation. His intervention provides an interesting insight into the level at which the 
top of the profession is willing to engage: in short opinion pieces published in edited 
collections that make no attempt to systematically rebut the key arguments of the 
opposition camp and that partially rely on the profession’s prestige to answer a 
substantive critique of the theory.  
 
It is notable that some contributors to the methodological debate have suggested reasons 
for the lack of engagement of the mainstream. The papers in Fullbrook (2009), in 
particular, provide a number of competing explanations that are worthy of 
consideration. Parenthetically, it should be noted that these contributions do not set out 
with the objective of explaining the limited impact of CSO on the modelling project (as 
we do). Instead, they do so implicitly, as part of the critiques the authors provide of 
Lawson’s published work.  
 
The explanations fall into three broad categories. The first focuses on the meta-
theoretical nature of the CSO project. Davidsen (2009) argues that ontological critique 
cannot succeed so long as it remains at the level of what Lawson calls ‘philosophical 
ontology’, namely the abstract conception of the social world upon which all economic 
theorising must rest in order for modelling methods to work. Instead, he calls for 
domain specific contributions that intervene directly in the theoretical debates of the 
mainstream. The idea is that economists would be compelled to respond if only CSO 
proposed new approaches and solutions to the problems identified by economists3. 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that that Tony Lawson has contributed significantly at the level of social scientific 
ontology in recent years, developing particular accounts of the nature of the corporation (Lawson 2014; 
2015) and of money (2012a, 2016). Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that this will generate much by 
way of interaction with the mainstream even if it may lead to an enriched discussion with other 
heterodox economists with interests in these areas. 
 The second explanation focuses on the discourse of economics and, in particular, the 
use of mathematical language to express and investigate economic ideas. Both 
Downward and Mearman (2009) and Hodgson (2009) question Lawson’s critique of 
the mathematical method in economics, the former with respect to econometrics and 
the latter with respect to modelling more generally. The disagreements share a family 
resemblance in that all three authors argue that, despite the strength of certain elements 
of the CSO critique, its impact is limited by the fact that Lawson appears to wholly 
reject the lingua franca of modern economics: deductive modelling. Adoption of some 
part of the modelling apparatus is therefore seen as a desirable requirement for a 
dialogue between CSO and mainstream economics. 
 
The third explanation, put forward by Bernard Guerrien (2009), focuses on ideology. 
Guerrien concludes that the insistence on mainstream modelling cannot be justified 
scientifically and masks a commitment to a neoclassical ideology that supports the 
spread and development of free market systems. The reason that mainstream 
economists have failed to engage with CSO is then readily explained by the presence 
of a fundamental ideological conflict between the two parties since Lawson and other 
proponents of CSO do not share their dogmatic commitment to free markets.  
 
The first two arguments may well be relevant sociological explanations of why CSO 
has been ignored by the mainstream. Indeed, recent work by sociologists on the 
structure and functioning of the economics profession (Fourcade et al 2015) has found 
that economists are hierarchical, inward looking, extremely committed to the technical 
toolkit of the profession, and increasingly focussed on fields of empirical application 
of their models at the expense of meta-theory. However, the third explanation may (at 
least partially) hit its mark. In his response to Guerrien (Lawson 2009) and a subsequent 
paper (Lawson 2012b), Lawson acknowledges the importance of ideology, understood 
as: ‘a relatively unchallenged set of (…) background ideas that every society or 
community possesses which forms the basis, or significantly informs, general opinion 
or “common sense”, a basis that remains somewhat invisible to most of its members, 
appearing as “neutral”, resting on preconceptions that are largely unexamined’ (Lawson 
2012b: 5). Contrary to Guerrien, however, Lawson identifies unquestioned reliance on 
mathematical modelling - rather than unquestioned optimism about free markets - as 
the central ideological element responsible for mainstream economics’ rigidity and 
failure.4 
 
 Yet, while Lawson’s analysis of mainstream economics’ ideology is (in our view) 
convincing, it nonetheless begs the question of its own ideological assumptions and of 
CSO’s capacity to critically reflect, identify and surmount them. CSO’s adoption of the 
critical realist conception of judgemental rationality seems, prima facie, to provide a 
safeguard against unwarranted doctrinal assumptions, that is, against ideology of the 
sort outlined above. But does it? This is the question to which turn in the next section. 
 
 
2. Social Ontology and the Judgment Gap 
 
                                                 
4 This debate about the relative role of market ideology vs mathematical formalism as the touchstone of 
mainstream economics has continued with the recent  publication of two reactions to Lawson’s 2012b 
paper by Milonakis (mimeo?/ this volume?) and O’Boyle and McDonough (2017). 
Since the publication of Roy Bhaskar’s pioneering early works in the philosophy of 
science (Bhaskar 1975; 1979), proponents of Critical Realism have argued that their 
contributions are founded upon three fundamental tenets often referred to as ontological 
realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality. Simplifying somewhat, 
these terms signal the acceptance of: 
 
1. A partly mind independent world of structured entities, including causal 
mechanisms, that underpin our experiences (ontological realism). 
2. A set of theories intended to describe those entities. All theories are socially 
produced; they are fallible and their meaningfulness is context specific 
(epistemological relativism). 
3. An ability by scientists, or some other relevant epistemic community, to agree 
which theories provide the most convincing connections between observed 
events and those mechanisms that cause them to happen (judgmental 
rationality). 
 
Despite continuing discussion of these foundational tenets (e.g. Groff 2000; Bhaskar 
1979/2014), subsequent contributions to social ontology (including CSO) have tended 
to take all three more or less for granted. And, when combined, they present an enticing 
perspective for critical-minded scholars. The commitment to ontological realism 
safeguards against the assumption -- which is often tacitly made by idealist and post-
modernist approaches -- that social reality is entirely created by our conceptions of it. 
The commitment to epistemological relativism provides a defence against the charge 
of absolutism and scientism that dogs positivist contributions (especially in the social 
sciences). But it is the appeal to judgmental rationality that holds it all together. 
Scientific theories must, somehow, connect to underlying causal mechanisms and 
scientists must, somehow, be able to identify such connections and rate theories 
accordingly. If judgmental rationality cannot help with the task of adjudicating between 
theories, then the critical resources of social ontologists are stripped away and there is 
a risk that the position becomes a species of irrationalism. But abandoning judgmental 
rationality in the social sciences is also problematic for ethical reasons. Indeed, 
epistemological judgments relative to theories (eg. which one is more plausible?) are 
inseparable from ethical judgments relative to social forms (which one is more 
conducive to human flourishing?). Put simply, if we can agree that a certain social form 
impedes human flourishing, then we can also agree, ceteris paribus,  that this social 
form should be eliminated, transformed or replaced5. 
 
Bhaskar insists that scientific practice is a social process which depends on 
intersubjective agreement within a community of scientists, and that their collective 
judgment remains fallible and potentially subject to revision (see esp. Bhaskar 2008: 
185-228). He also rejects a correspondence theory of truth and states that knowledge of 
the underlying causal mechanisms is always knowledge under some particular 
theoretical description (Bhaskar 2008: 241). However, he maintains that at least some 
                                                 
5 Although Bhaskar claims that he dedicated his third book Scientific Realism and Human 
Emancipation to the third tenet of critical realism (judgmental rationality), this is not exactly what we 
have found on the several occasions when we have read it. The book offers first and foremost an 
extremely sophisticated, and exploratory, critique of positivism under its various guises. While the 
chapter on 'critical naturalism and the dialectic of human emancipation' features important arguments 
on the link between facts and values, there is very little on the social processes through which agents 
engage in judgementally rational discussion 
of the results of scientific enquiry can be ‘detached’ from theory and treated as truths 
upon which further theories can be built. In order for this to be possible, however, 
theoretical controversies must be settled on rational grounds. How these controversies 
are settled is a matter for scientists to decide, but the mere presence of intersubjective 
agreement is clearly not sufficient. In A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar emphasises 
the role of explanatory power as a key criterion, but does not give a comprehensive 
account of the underpinnings of rational scientific judgment: 
 
“In order to render intelligible scientific change and to reconcile it with the idea of 
scientific progress we must have the concept of an ontological realm, of objects apart 
from our descriptions of them. We can then allow, for example, that theory Ta is 
preferable to theory Tb, even if in the terminology of Kuhn and Feyerabend it is 
‘incommensurable’ with it, if theory Ta can explain under its descriptions almost all 
the phenomena p1…pn that Tb can explain under its descriptions Bp1… Bpn plus 
some significant phenomena that Tb cannot explain.” (Bhaskar 2008: 240) 
 
Writing from within the critical realist tradition, Ruth Groff (2000) has noted that 
judgmental rationality remains largely unarticulated in Bhaskar’s early philosophical 
writings and was substituted with the problematic concept of ‘alethic truth’ in his later 
writings6. She notes that: 
 
“From the beginning, there was the question of the relationship between ontological 
realism and rationality at the level of judgment. Despite Bhaskar’s early claim that 
“there is no way in which we can look at the world and then at a sentence and ask 
whether they fit” (Bhaskar 1979: 249), there has been a presumption, I would argue, at 
least among readers of Bhaskar, that accepted scientific theories do achieve such a fit—
and that accountability to the idea of such a fit is precisely what is meant by the notion 
of rationality at the level of judgment. Moreover, there has been a tendency to regard 
the principle of ontological realism as providing an anchor for, and as thereby 
authorizing, judgmental rationality so construed. According to this line of reasoning, it 
is possible to discriminate between competing theories on rational grounds exactly 
because there is a real, intransitive domain, the causal structure of which may be more 
or less accurately identified by competing causal accounts.” (Groff 2000: 418) 
 
More specifically, Groff’s contribution points to a ‘judgment gap’ that, we believe, 
persists today in the literature on social ontology: if one takes the notion of 
epistemological relativism seriously, then the challenge is to elaborate a more 
comprehensive account of how certain intersubjective agreements come to be justified 
as scientifically legitimate whilst others do not. 
 
How does this apply to CSO more specifically? As we saw above, Lawson’s critique is 
grounded in ontology – more specifically the mismatch between philosophical ontology 
and mainstream economic theory – but he also recognises that theories are human 
constructions that are separate from the underlying mechanisms and processes that they 
aim to describe. Early on, he subscribed explicitly to Bhaskar’s three tenets, using the 
critical realist concepts of the transitive and intransitive domains: 
  
                                                 
6 The first point at least is acknowledged by Bhaskar in a more recent contribution (Bhaskar 2007). 
“If knowledge is not merely given in experience, it is hardly intelligible that it is created 
out of nothing. It must, then, come about through a transformation of pre-existing 
knowledge-like materials. In other words, it is necessary … to recognise a transitive 
dimension to knowledge, or epistemology to complement the intransitive dimension to 
knowledge, or ontology, already established. That is, it is necessary to recognise a 
dimension of transitive objects of knowledge, including facts, observations, theories, 
hypotheses, guesses, hunches, intuitions, speculations, anomalies, etc., which condition 
all further knowledge, and in particular facilitate, and come to be actively transformed 
through, the laborious social practice of science. In short, knowledge must be 
recognised as a produced means of production (of further knowledge) and science as 
an ongoing transformative social activity.” (Lawson 1997: 25) 
 
But Lawson’s focus (unlike Bhaskar’s) is economics and the contested nature of the 
field means that defining progress and justifying theory choice are never far from the 
forefront of his mind. Thus he provides a more elaborate account of explanatory power 
than the sketch provided by Bhaskar: the theory of contrastive explanation. This 
position has been developed at length subsequently, so we will only provide a brief 
description here. The essence of the argument is that knowledge of the social world is 
derived from the identification of rough empirical patterns termed ‘demi-regs’. Demi-
regs are imperfect associations between two or more measured variables that may hint 
at the operation of an underlying causal mechanism. When our expectations of such 
patterns within a specified ‘contrast space’ are flouted, for instance because two 
patterns that we expect to be similar (crop yields in neighbouring fields) turn out to be 
different, then this can provide insight into the operation of the underlying mechanism. 
In the social sciences in particular, insights can be of two basic sorts: 
 
“The basis of our surprise may indeed be a new causal factor coming into play, but 
equally it may merely be that our prior assessment of the nature of the contrast space 
was significantly in error all along. From such considerations we can see that the 
possibility of a progressive transformation in our knowledge does not require that we 
have judged the contrast space correctly, merely that we had rational grounds for the 
judgment formed” (Lawson 2003: 91, my italics) 
 
Despite his valuable elaboration of the concept of explanatory power applied to the 
social sciences, Lawson’s position effectively inherits the questions raised about 
Bhaskar’s judgment gap. The progress of social science is fundamentally dependent on 
judgmental rationality, which is responsible for setting the limits of the contrast space, 
for forming expectations based on anterior knowledge, for qualifying observed 
situations as ‘surprises’ or contradictions to expectations, and for prompting a need for 
revision of existing theory and further theoretical elaboration. We can see, even in the 
simple case of identifying mechanisms behind unequal crop growth in a given field, 
that there is no ready-made or rationally deducible formula for setting a contrast space 
and deriving conclusions from it. The presence of a river, or parasitic animals or shaded 
areas all seem prima facie equally plausible candidates that are neither exclusive nor 
exhaustive.  Yet, to avoid irrationalism, Lawson requires the setting of the contrast 
space, and the conclusions drawn from it, to be established on some grounds other than 
context specific intersubjective agreement. It is not legitimate for two scientists to 
decide to attribute unequal crop growth to parasites on the sole basis that doing so would 
please a friend owning a pest-control company. In other words, a properly scientific 
approach does not only attempt to establish agreement among present participants, but 
it should also seek to secure agreement from putative participants as well. Indeed, 
Lawson’s critique of mainstream economics would suffer significantly if this were not 
the case as it would be objected that he is attempting to replace the mainstream 
economics project with an incoherent programme that can only envisage local 
agreements and that is not conducive to growing or refining knowledge over time.  
 
This leaves CSO in a similar position to the CR-inspired philosophical research that 
preceded it. Since judgmental rationality cannot simply be read off from ontological 
realism, proponents cannot ignore the problem of how justification is constructed in the 
social sciences. The CSO critique of mainstream economics exacerbates this need 
because there is widespread intersubjective agreement amongst mainstream economists 
that their methods are appropriate and their core theoretical and empirical findings are 
reliable. A judgmental relativist would be forced to either accept this position, or cast 
his or her critique purely in terms of competing ideologies, something that Lawson has 
repeatedly resisted doing (see our argument in Part 1). Needless to say, we do not 
consider this to be a fatal flaw in the CSO project, but it does indicate an important area 
for theoretical development. We do not believe that proponents of CSO are engaged in 
an internal debate which relies on purely local / intersubjective justificatory 
mechanisms (indeed their explicit rejection of postmodernism is strong evidence of this 
position). Out of instinct and common sense, most of their studies seek to secure some 
form of potentially universalisable justifiability: they are intended to convince their 
interlocutors through some combination of logical argument, demonstrations of 
explanatory power, and empirical evidence. And yet this universalisable justifiability 
fails to convince mainstream economists. It remains unclear therefore what the 
conditions of possibility of this universalisable justifiability are. What are its limits? On 
what grounds is it criticisable by mainstream economics? And how might such a 
critique ultimately be deemed legitimate?    
 
One difficulty facing CSO, like any other research programme, is that, by definition, 
its ideological assumptions are opaque to it. Fortunately, ideological opacity does not 
imply impenetrability and can be surmounted to some extent. Our current project is 
relatively modest as we endeavour to clarify some, rather than all, the assumptions of 
CSO. Yet, even such a pared-down endeavour is not trivial. How can a given project 
clarify at least some of its own unseen assumptions?  
 
Our chosen approach consists in pursuing our analysis from a different, yet largely 
congruent, interpretative framework. This shift allows us to objectify CSO and step 
back from its (non-) debate with mainstream economics. Our intention in the rest of the 
paper is therefore to treat CSO as an object of analysis rather than as an analytical 
resource. Metaphorically, we are trying to see our own eyes but need a mirror to do so. 
The économie des conventions, or French convention school, initially developed in the 
late 1980s by Luc Boltanski, François Eymard-Duvernay, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Olivier 
Favereau, Robert Salais and Laurent Thevenot and now pursued by thousands of 
researchers around the world provides one such mirror. 
 
 
3. The EC on Justification: a primer 
 
Like Bhaskar, Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) start with the idea of judgment, though 
unlike Bhaskar their concern is not so much with the rational judgment of scientists, 
but more with the general conditions under which judgments made by social agents are 
or can be made legitimate. While the primary concern of Bhaskar and Lawson is with 
how knowledge can be justified and truth be (tentatively) established, Boltanski and 
Thevenot are principally interested in how social objects and configurations can be 
justified, and how legitimacy is established. They introduce their meta-theoretical 
framework  with a lively example: 
 
‘Let us consider, for example, a dispute between two drivers after a collision. 
The furious indignation of the first can stem from a series of heterogeneous 
vexations he suffered the same day: his wife fell ill; his son had very bad grades 
at school; his boss humiliated him; he is anxious about a pain in his throat 
(maybe cancer) and, in addition to that, this stupid guy bumps into his new, 
beautiful car. That’s too much! But the second driver can also have a series of 
personal reasons to complain against a nasty world: his mother just died the day 
before; his taxes have increased; his last book has been refused by the publisher 
and, moreover, there is this idiot, in the middle of the road. That’s too much! If 
they want to escape violence they must be able to eliminate most of these 
motives of discontent as ‘private’ and to converge towards a common definition 
of the relevant objects in the situations – such as highway codes, states of tires, 
etc. But in order to converge in sorting out relevant and irrelevant items they 
must share a common capacity to see what fits the situation and under which 
relation. They need, hence, a common definition of the form of generality which 
allows to connect this situation with other ones identified as similar.’ (Boltanski 
and Thevenot, 1999: 361). 
 
   
There is certainly quite a bit to unpack in the above example and the last sentence, in 
particular, deserves additional explanation for readers unfamiliar with the économie des 
conventions. What do the authors mean by a ‘form of generality’? And why does 
justification necessitate that ‘the specific situation be connected with other ones 
identified as similar’? 
 
Just as critical realism defends the principle that there are multiple ways of referring to 
a state of affairs (epistemological relativism), the économie des conventions supposes 
that there are multiple ways of describing and justifying a state of affairs. It does not 
follow that anything goes, but rather that, to be generalizable and understandable by 
other social agents, descriptions, justifications, valuations and critiques must follow a 
certain grammar. They must be expressed and assembled in certain ways that make 
them recognisable by other agents who are capable of using the same grammar. Some 
elements of this grammar are culturally and historically specific while others are 
universal across human societies (more on this below). 
  
Whilst Boltanski and Thevenot do not use the idea of judgmental rationality explicitly, 
we believe it is nonetheless at the heart of their model of situated judgement. Indeed, 
they explicitly reject an irrationalist stance and argue instead that ‘arguments have to 
be solid enough to be able to resist questions of an indeterminate number of new, not 
yet specified, partners’ (Boltanski and Thevenot 2000: 214). Of central importance for 
our purposes, their framework provides a conceptual prism through which it is possible 
to compare and contrast CSO’s judgemental rationality with the competing conception 
of judgment implicit in mainstream economic approaches. But let us illustrate the 
économie des conventions’ basic features on the simpler example of the car accident 
mentioned above before mobilising it in the next section to compare the more complex 
and contested ideological configurations of CSO, mainstream economics theory and 
mainstream economics practice. 
  
Boltanski and Thevenot analyse ideological configurations, aka polities or worlds of 
worth, by systematically studying how agents engage in justification and critique. To 
do so, they identify common higher principles through which agents extract themselves 
from their immediate situation and rise to a higher level of generality. For instance, 
while profitability constitutes the higher principle of the market world, it is second to 
efficiency in the world of production and to the collective will in the civic world. Thus, 
the same object, say a car accident will be valued according to its monetary cost in the 
market world (how much?), to the traffic inefficiencies generated in the industrial world 
(how many hours lost for how many drivers?) and to the respect of driving codes in the 
civic world (which rules have been broken by whom?)  
 
Judgments of worth operate by bringing together persons and objects into 
homogeneous, recognisable, categories. This operation is designated by Boltanski and 
Thevenot as the qualification of persons and objects. Thus, whether a given object, say 
again a road accident, is qualified as a monetary loss or as a traffic perturbation or as 
an infringement to the law will determine in which world of worth its value will be 
justified. And conversely, justifying an accident’s worth only in terms of its market 
value presupposes that we are dismissing other worlds of worth. Think, for example of 
a careless driver stopping after the collision and handing an envelope filled with bank 
notes while uttering: ‘this should cover your costs, let’s never talk about this again’.  
 
To be legitimate, a polity must endow all participants with common humanity, that is, 
with equal capacity in principle to participate in social life by qualifying situations, 
issuing judgments of worth, issuing critiques and putting judgments to the test. With 
the exception of utopian homogeneous communities, the principle of common 
humanity coexists in tension with the fact that agents have differential access in practice 
to what they are all equally entitled to in principle. Thus, while every human being may 
in principle be able to determine who is at fault in a complex car accident (and thus act 
as a magistrate or judge), some individuals are deemed to be better qualified than others 
to exercise such judgments. 
 
In a legitimate polity, the worth of a person or an object is regularly subjected to 
reappraisal through tests of worth. Thus a driver’s worth will be confirmed or 
questioned depending on how she handles dangerous traffic situations unfolding while 
the tests of worth for a car will depend on the world of worth within which it is 
inscribed. A car’s worth may be tested at the time of selling it (market world), when it 
is driven at speed on a rainy motorway (industrial world) or when it passes anti-
pollution controls (civic world).  
 
The coexistence of different polities encompassing different principles and tests of 
worth is naturally subject to conflict. Indeed, critique occupies a central place in 
Boltanski and Thevenot’s model, and a substantial portion of their work retraces the 
various ways in which each polity can be mobilised to criticise a specific social 
configuration. Thus the driver responsible for the road accident can be criticised for 
having broken a rule (civic world), for having lost control of his/her car (industrial 
world) or for having generated a monetary loss (market world). But ideological 
configurations, as much as the social objects which are inscribed in them, can be the 
target of critique. As an illustration, critiques from the civic world can be mobilised 
towards the market world (deemed to be unfair because it privileges haves over have 
nots) and towards the industrial world (deemed to privilege performance at the expense 
of respect for due procedure).  
 
The preceding summary of Boltanski and Thevenot’s model provides us with the basic 
lens through which we may now examine the modes of justification employed by CSO 
in contradistinction with those employed by mainstream economics. 
 
 
4. Justification in CSO and Mainstream Economics: an EC perspective 
 
We now mobilise Boltanski and Thevenot’s approach to make sense of the dialogue of 
the deaf between CSO and mainstream economics. One difficulty is that the practices 
and the theories of mainstream economists are frequently, and normally, out of touch 
(see Dequech 2017 for a recent discussion). Leamer (1978) famously argued that the 
practice and theory of mainstream economics are largely disconnected. As he put it: 
 
‘The opinion that econometric theory is largely irrelevant is held by an 
embarrassingly large share of the economics profession. … We 
comfortably divide ourselves into a celibate priesthood of statistical 
theorists, on the one hand, and a legion of inveterate sinner-data 
analysts, on the other. … I began thinking about these problems when I 
was a graduate student in economics at the University of Michigan, 
1966-1970. At that time there was a very active group building an 
econometric model of the United States. As it happens, the econometric 
modelling was done in the basement of the building and the econometric 
theory courses were taught on the top floor (the third). I was perplexed 
by the fact that the same language was used in both places. Even more 
amazing was the transmogrification of particular individuals who 
wantonly sinned in the basement and metamorphosed into the highest of 
high priests as they ascended to the third floor.’ (Leamer 1978: vi) 
 
The near schizophrenic situation described by Leamer encourages us to distinguish, in 
our analysis, between the ideological configuration of mainstream economics theory 
and the ideological configuration of mainstream economics practice. A careful reader 
might also query on what basis can we assume an equivalence between ‘econometrics’, 
‘mainstream economics’ and ‘mainstream modelling’. This equivalence is justified in 
light of the arguments developed by Lawson (2006: 491-495), Cf. section 1 above. 
 
The EC model outlined above (section 3) provides us with an analytical lens that allows 
us to observe CSO and mainstream economics theory and practice as ideological 
configurations. More specifically, the EC model invites us to systematically flesh out, 
compare and contrast otherwise taken for granted assumptions regarding each 
ideological formation’s common higher principle; qualification of persons and objects; 
principles of common humanity and legitimate tests of worth. 
 
4.1. Common higher principles 
Researchers operating from within each of these ideological configurations must 
espouse a common higher principle in order to attain a level of generality that allows 
them to transcend purely subjective judgments. Differences in these principles are 
expressed explicitly in the case of CSO and mainstream economics. As we saw in the 
discussion of the CSO’s contrastive method, the proximate objective of theorising is to 
explain the range of causal mechanisms underlying observable patterns in events. And 
this common higher principle is anchored in at least two further values: an epistemic 
commitment to truth and a normative commitment to emancipation, both inherited from 
critical realism. In contrast, since Friedman’s (1953) intervention, the proximate 
objective of mainstream theorising has been predictive success. Again, this common 
higher principle masks a deeply held epistemic commitment to mathematical rigour, 
and a normative commitment to technocratic utility and policy relevance. However, 
mainstream economic practice has notably failed to produce accurate predictions of 
future states of affairs and even trend prediction seems to be beyond the grasp of most 
mainstream modellers. This has led mainstream economists to retreat to a different 
proximate goal in practice: disciplinary prestige. To produce ‘good economics’ has 
become a very complex and difficult task that is highly prized within the academy and 
(at least until recently) outside it. The underlying epistemic commitment to 
mathematical rigour remains, but it is underpinned by a different (in this case aesthetic) 
commitment to the elegance and simplicity of models rather than the production of 
accurate predictions. 
 
4.2. Qualification of persons and objects 
The process of ‘qualification’ is also radically different across polities. The CSO 
approach presupposes that social entities are concept-dependent and thus recognizes 
that social science (including economics) are characterized by ‘an inescapable 
hermeneutic moment, one that (…) may be of greater consequences than any similar or 
comparable moment in natural science.’ (Lawson 1997: 35). Participants’ reasons 
should not only be interpreted, but their causes and effects should also be explained in 
terms of causal mechanisms discovered via the investigation of surprising contrasts. On 
the other hand, mainstream economics in theory focusses on the quantifiable data of 
observed reality, and, in practice, is heavily constrained by the technical toolkit that 
dominates the profession (though its content may change over time). And these 
differences have significant consequences for the ways in which judgments are put to 
test and justifications are produced. Whilst the contrastive method suggests that 
prediction will be difficult to attain outside controlled settings and focusses on the 
discovery of hitherto unidentified causal mechanisms, mainstream economists maintain 
that accurate predictions are possible and advocate rigorous econometric testing. 
Failure to predict economic events has led, however, to the development of other tests 
in practice. Rather than accurate forecasts, quality is established via a self-referential 
process involving the laborious scrutiny of models in the peer review process of leading 
journals. If publication in one of a very small number of such prestigious journals is 
secured, the value of the publication becomes a tradeable commodity that is not 
necessarily connected to the content of the article. In many cases such publications will 
secure career advancement for the author.  
 
It is worth noting that CSO researchers are subject to similar social constraints as long 
as they attempt to maintain a position in an academic economics department. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that CSO researchers who had obtained top marks in mathematical 
degrees from top universities had either to accept teaching-focused positions or had to 
pursue their careers in departments less obsessed with mainstream economics’ modes 
of qualification. These survival routes include universities outside the English speaking 
world and business schools. 
 
4.3 Principles of common humanity 
The principles of common humanity that underpin each approach are also at odds. The 
CSO follows the social sciences in positing reflexive human subjects, partially 
constituted by the relations that they have with each other. Human reflexivity extends 
beyond lay people’s ability to interpret social situations and also encompasses their 
ability to understand the conclusions of economists/social scientists and orient their 
activities accordingly. This ‘double hermeneutic’ (a term coined by Giddens 1984 but 
re-employed by Lawson 1997: 197; 2009: 279-80) establishes a symmetry, in terms of 
human dignity, between laymen and economists. 
 
In contrast, mainstream economists focus on the economic agent as an isolated atom. 
Mainstream economic theorists arrived at a well-defined conception of the economic 
agent as a rational optimiser (whether individual or collective) which guarantees a 
common humanity of economic subjects across models but which falls short of 
maintaining a symmetry between the researcher and the researched. In practice this 
conception of rational atomistic agents has become increasingly flexible in order to 
accommodate new theoretical ideas emanating from within the discipline, but the 
reflexive and relational features of human subjects have continued to be ignored since 
they cannot be incorporated into the standard technical toolkit. While an impoverished 
yet common humanity of agents is still maintainable in the specific context of each 
model, the multiplication of models has generated a corresponding multiplication of 
conceptions of humanity. Moreover, the interpretation of mathematical rigour as 
modelling prowess has encouraged the introduction of unreal, and ultimately inhuman, 
characteristics beyond atomicity and rational optimization (for a defence of unrealistic 
assumptions, see Kanazawa 1998). These include, depending on models, infinitely 
lived individuals, agents capable of accessing and processing complete information, or 
endowed with perfect memories, and so on. 
 
4.4 Tests of worth 
Partly because of the above differences, CSO and mainstream economics rely on very 
different ways of testing the legitimacy of their own judgements. While CSO 
recognizes the fallibility and relativity of knowledge claims, it also defends a 
conception of judgmental rationality that posits that products of academic activity can 
and should be judged on the basis of their relative power to explaining surprising states 
of affairs. We have examined in section 2 (above) some of the internal limitations of 
tests of legitimacy based on CSO’s ontological and epistemological premises as CSO 
determines some aspects of the dynamics of justification while leaving others open to 
discussion between participants. 
 
Yet, the internal limitations of CSO’s judgmental rationality and associated tests do not 
allow us, on their own, to understand the dialogue of the deaf with mainstream 
economics. This deafness can only be understood if we also appreciate how further 
apart mainstream economics’ tests of legitimacy are from CSO’s. Indeed, mainstream 
theorists evaluate the legitimacy of economic theories with regards to their predictive 
power. One consequence is that they have little patience for explanatory projects. The 
only version of explanation they are ready to accept as legitimate must conform to 
something like Hempel’s deductive-nomological model. That is, a version of 
‘explanation’ that corresponds to a specific case of past-oriented prediction (for a 
defence of this approach to explanation, see Hempel 1965).  
 
Another, equally important consequence of valuing predictive power, is that tests of 
worth based on predictive success have failed repeatedly over the past 50 years or so. 
No sooner a prediction seems confirmed that new data disconfirms it (Lawson 1997, 
ch. 7). The response of mainstream modellers is, however, telling. Rather than 
discrediting their own ideological configuration, they seem to have protected it by 
having recourse to a less damning test consisting in showcasing mathematical prowess. 
Hence, Friedman’s observation that ‘economics has become increasingly an arcane 
branch of mathematics rather than dealing with real economic problems.’ (Friedman, 
1999: 137, cited in Lawson 2006: 490), 
 
While mainstream economic theory views CSO explanations as partial and imperfect 
approximations of a properly scientific explanation (as past-oriented reversed 
prediction), the gap is even wider when we consider the tests of legitimacy employed 
by practitioners, rather than theorists, of mainstream economics. The slip from tests of 
worth based on prediction to tests of worth based on mathematical prowess are, of 
course, at the heart of the efforts, hopes and fears of practicing economists. But on these 
theoretical tests are intertwined with other, more institutional, tests employed when 
valuing the worth of an economist. The latter include securing promotion through 
publication in prestigious journals and by securing influence outside academia, for 
instance by obtaining roles in private or national banks, in political think tanks, and so 
on. And conversely, authors who have not succeeded through these rites of passage are 
considered either as failed economists or as researchers in a different field of the social 
sciences.  
 
5. Discussion: cracks in the mainstream citadel 
 
Through these contrasts we can see how CSO, mainstream theory and mainstream 
practice constitute quite different ideological configurations. The gulf between the 
mainstream and CSO is not merely explainable by reference to different languages and 
different theoretical assumptions about the nature of their objects of study. If that were 
the case, then some of these gaps might have been bridged during the last thirty years. 
Rather, the ongoing dialogue of the deaf is the by-product of the adoption of completely 
different normative frameworks of justification. And, since these frameworks anchor 
judgments within each polity, conflict between polities cannot be settled by using them. 
While our assessment of mathematical modelling’s hegemony is largely congruent with 
Lawson (2006, 2012b), our EC analysis also highlights aspects which are arguably 
downplayed by Lawson and indicate potential weaknesses in the mainstream 
hegemony. 
 
The first weakness is that the practices of mainstream economics are, from an EC 
perspective, open to contestation on the grounds of their violation of the principle of 
common humanity. Indeed, mainstream economists presuppose differences between 
scientists and laypersons that can be interpreted, from a perspective that values equal 
human dignity, as an arrogant stance held by ‘experts’ in the face of ‘common people’. 
It is noteworthy that the discussions preceding the United Kingdom’s recent 
referendum on exiting the European Union highlighted defiance of the British 
population at large towards ‘experts’ in general and towards economists in particular. 
Perhaps approaches influenced by CSO and based on observation, discussion with 
economic agents and on the formulation of fallible hypotheses - rather than on obscure 
and failing mathematical models - could win again the hearts of the general public 
including university students? (see Favereau 2015 for an insightful account of orthodox 
economists’ arrogance towards heterodox colleagues). 
 
The second weakness is that, while CSO’s critique of mainstream economics has 
developed by examining the latter’s ontological assumptions, another, perhaps more 
effective critique, might focus on the tests of legitimacy employed by mainstream 
economics. And critiques addressing the fact that theorists have failed to predict over 
sustained periods of time or that they have been more concerned with departmental 
politics than with the quest for truth are perhaps likely to gather more traction than 
critiques of questionable ontological presuppositions. Indeed, our succinct économie 
des conventions analysis invites us and our readers to contemplate future research on 
the organisation of tests of legitimacy within those organisations employing 
economists. Thus, rather than seeking a grand narrative in terms of the domination of 
mathematical modelling in Western Society, as Lawson does quite successfully, our 
paper invites researchers to retrace the various struggles through which mainstream 
economics’ tests of legitimacy have grown in importance in universities and other 
academic institutions. Such studies could, at their most basic level, consist of a 
longitudinal comparison of exam scripts in reputable departments of economics. The 
apparition, and then dominance, of mathematical exercises could be valuably put in 
perspective by documentary analysis of minutes, memoirs of scholars and, perhaps, 
interviews of emeriti who lived long enough to still remember earlier practices. More 
complex studies might also establish links between the transformation of tests of worth 
with the spread of neo-liberal think tanks in the McCarthyite USA and anti-communist 
Britain (see the works of Djelic on the creation of Atlas, esp. Djelic 2014).  
 
We believe that attending to these, sometimes downplayed or forgotten struggles, might 
shed light on now defunct but eventually or partly resurrectable, tests of legitimacy for 
the community of academics interested in the study of economic phenomena (see Al-
Amoudi and Latsis 2015 for a social theoretical account of institutional death and the 
significance of forgotten struggles).    
 
Conclusion 
 
The EC framework allows us to go further than merely noting the absence of dialogue 
between CSO and mainstream economics. It offers us a prism through which CSO can 
be compared and contrasted with the theory and practice of mainstream economics. Our 
EC prism allows us to avoid ad hominem considerations and to identify fundamental 
differences impeding dialogue between the two approaches to the study of economic 
phenomena. We have illustrated how the two programmes differed in terms of their 
higher common principles, the way they qualify persons and objects, the demands they 
put on common humanity and the trials through which claims to validity are tested and 
judged.  
 
By adopting an EC grid of analysis, we could provide a systematic examination of the 
basic disputes between CSO and the theory and practice of mainstream economics. 
Although we acknowledge our sympathy for the CSO programme, it is also our belief 
that the EC framework facilitated a comparison that is more impartial than if it had been 
formulated from within a single programme. 
 
In this respect, the greatest advantage of the EC framework is that it has helped us to 
step back and delineate some of the limits of the judgmental rationality that is at the 
heart of the CSO approach. Indeed, CSO takes for granted higher common principles 
based on truth and human emancipation. By doing so, it fails to convince interlocutors 
who would regard truth and emancipation in high esteem but would nonetheless 
privilege further another (set of) values. While we have no doubt that mainstream 
economists hold some regard for truth and human emancipation, our analysis indicates 
that mainstream theorists hold predictive accuracy in even greater esteem while 
practitioners of economics seem particularly enthused by mathematical elegance and 
securing influence over decision –making. But these differences concern neither the 
nature of the world, nor the nature of knowledge, but rather the nature of the values at 
the heart of the economic sciences, and the structure of those tests through which 
academic worth is evaluated. Behind the grand narrative of the hegemony of science as 
mathematics (Lawson 2012b), our approach attracts attention to small scale struggles 
through which current tests of legitimacy came to be established. Our analysis also 
invites us to observe and imagine struggle tactics that may invalidate or replace them. 
And behind the ontological and epistemological dispute opposing CSO to mainstream 
economics, our study also indicates the existence of an equally important axiological 
dispute. 
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